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Abstract: Governments use different regulatory instruments to ensure that businesses owners or “inspectees” comply 
with rules and regulations. One tool that is increasingly applied is disclosing inspectees’ performance information to 
other stakeholders. Disclosing performance information has consequences for street-level bureaucrats because it increases 
the visibility of their day-to-day work. Using a survey (n = 507) among Dutch inspectors of the Netherlands Food and 
Consumer Product Safety Authority, this article shows that the disclosure of performance information has an impact 
on enforcement style at the street level. Findings show that perceived disclosed performance information positively 
enhances all three dimensions of street-level bureaucrats’ enforcement style (legal, facilitation, and accommodation). 
This effect is strongest for facilitation and accommodation and weakest for the legal style. Perceived resistance by 
inspectees partly explains this effect. Contrary to expectations, more perceived disclosure does not result in more but in 
less perceived resistance of inspectees by street-level bureaucrats.
Evidence for Practice
• Disclosing performance information may have implications not only for business owners and citizens 
but also for inspectors. This study shows that disclosure of performance information influences the way 
inspectors behave during face-to-face encounters with inspectees.
• Disclosure of performance information makes inspectors more active in the sense of intensifying 
their enforcement style. They especially use their discretionary space to apply a more facilitative and 
accommodative style, but they also—to a lesser extent—become more legal in their enforcement style.
• Inspectors do not see growing problems of resistance among inspectees as result of disclosing performance 
information; instead, they perceive less resistance.
Inspectors are classic street-level bureaucrats with considerable autonomy and discretion to make judgments about the applicability of sanctions 
during interactions with clients (Lipsky 2010) 
such as business owners. However, they are not the 
only ones responsible for ensuring that businesses 
or “inspectees” adhere to rules and regulations. 
Inspectors function in a network of stakeholders 
(Klijn and Koppenjan 2016; Meijer 2013) that 
includes, for instance, consumers, public service 
organizations, business organizations, and the media. 
This context triggers regulators to use that network 
to stimulate compliance of inspectees, such as schools 
and hospitals. Making the compliance performance 
of inspectees available to the public is an instrument 
that helps activate stakeholders operating in networks. 
This disclosure of performance information allows 
stakeholders to hold inspectees accountable (Bovens 
2007). For example, parents can question schools 
when they underperform, or consumers can hold 
firms responsible for poor quality of products (Van de 
Walle and Bouckaert 2003). The media may catch up 
with this information and report negatively, which, in 
turn, can damage the image of inspectees (see Bennett 
2016; Eshuis and Klijn 2012).
Regulators disclose performance information in 
different ways, such as passively presenting policy 
information (de Fine Licht 2014; Grimmelikhuijsen 
and Meijer 2014; Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2013; Van 
Erp 2010), actively publishing sanctions (Ayres and 
Braithwaite 1992; Van Erp 2011), or constructing 
rating and rankings (Hood, Dixon, and Beeston 2008; 
Van de Walle and Roberts 2008). Different ways of 
disclosing performance information by governments 
vary, for instance, in their degree of completeness, 
coloring, and usability (Douglas and Meijer 2016). 
However, they all share the intention of stimulating 
compliance of inspectees (Meijer 2013; Meijer and 
Homburg 2009; Van de Walle and Roberts 2008) by 
activating other stakeholders to act on the information 
(e.g., Meijer 2013). For instance, consumers may stop 
eating at a local lunchroom if it is disclosed that it 
does not comply with hygiene rules and regulations. 
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This article focuses on disclosed information about the compliance 
performance of inspectees provided by government agencies for 
other stakeholders.
Research on disclosing performance information at the street level 
is scarce, and its impact remains unclear (e.g., Etienne 2015). 
Scholars usually address other actors, such as public managers (e.g., 
Moynihan and Pandey 2010), businesses (e.g., Meijer and Homburg 
2009), or citizens (e.g., James 2011; Van de Walle and Roberts 
2008). The implications for inspectors are largely missing in this 
debate. The aim of this study, therefore, is to understand the impact 
of disclosure of performance information on street-level behavior, 
specifically from the viewpoint of inspectors. This study proposes 
that investigating disclosed performance information may facilitate 
clarifications because this instrument might have important 
implications for inspectors’ day-to-day encounters with inspectees 
and, in turn, their enforcement style (Mascini and Van Wijk 2009; 
May and Wood 2003).
First and foremost, the work of inspectors is becoming more 
visible to the public, which makes them more accountable. The 
way inspectors enforce can be scrutinized by the public, which, 
in turn, may impact the enforcement style (Schillemans 2008; 
Winter 2003). Second, inspectees’ (non)compliance will be part 
of the public sphere, which may influence the way they behave 
toward inspectors during regulatory encounters (Levi-Faur 2011; 
Murphy 2004). Especially for inspectees who do not comply, risks 
and uncertainties are increased, which may trigger more resistance 
at the street level. Inspectors may, as a consequence, enforce 
in a more legal manner (see Etienne 2015). In sum, disclosing 
performance information potentially increases the visibility of 
inspectors and triggers inspectees during regulatory interactions. 
Therefore, the central research question is, to what extent does 
the perceived disclosure of performance information have an impact 
on inspectors’ enforcement style during regulatory encounters? 
This research contributes theoretically as it investigates why 
inspectors enforce the way they do by showing the direct impact 
of perceived disclosure of performance information (see Ayres 
and Braithwaite 1992; Meijer and Homburg 2009; Van Erp 
2011; Van de Walle and Roberts 2008) and the indirect impact of 
perceived resistance by inspectees at the front lines (see Etienne 
2013, 2015; Van Erp 2009).
This article is structured as follows: The theoretical foundations 
will be discussed first, including conceptualizations of disclosing 
performance information, enforcement style, and potentially 
influential factors such as perceived resistance. Then, the 
methodological considerations will be presented, followed by the 
findings based on a survey (n = 507) of Dutch inspectors of the 
Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority. Finally, 
a conclusion and discussion of the implications for understanding 
enforcement at the front lines and policy implementation are 
provided.
Conceptual Framework and Expectations
According to May and Wood (2003, 119), “enforcement style is 
a concept that is easily understood in the abstract but hard to pin 
down in the specifics.” It has been described as “regulatory style” 
(Gormley 1998; Kagan 1994), styles of enforcement that vary 
(Hutter 1989), or it is intertwined with the concept of enforcement 
strategies (May and Wood 2003). The general notion of these 
different labels of enforcement style addresses inspectors’ ways of 
enforcing at the front line as well as their ways of interacting with 
their inspectees (May and Winter 1999, 2000; May and Wood 
2003). Enforcement style is defined as “the character of the day-to-
day interactions of inspectors when dealing with representatives of 
regulated entities” (May and Wood 2003, 119).
Enforcement style can be understood as a single or a 
multidimensional concept (Kagan 1994; May and Winter 1999, 
2000). Traditionally, it was studied along a single dimension. Kagan 
(1994), for instance, used the rigidness of applying rules to study 
enforcement style. More recently, however, scholars have shown 
empirically that enforcement style is multidimensional (e.g., de 
Boer 2017; Lo, Fryxell, and Van Rooij 2009; May and Winter 
1999, 2000). May and Winter (1999, 2000) illustrate that an 
inspector’s typical enforcement style is better understood as being 
two-dimensional, consisting of formalism and coercion. The formal 
dimension refers to inspectors’ degrees of formality and flexibility, 
while coercion addresses the levels of trust and willingness of 
inspectors to use threats. These two dimensions can be applied at 
the same time or separately. This suggests that enforcement style is 
multifaceted and more nuanced than originally thought. Therefore, 
exploring more enforcement style dimensions can facilitate a deeper 
level of understanding (Winter and May 2011).
Lo, Fryxell, and Van Rooij (2009) make an important contribution 
and bring forward that enforcement style is composed of five 
dimensions. The first is formalism, which is “adherence to rather 
rigid legal requirements” (2709). A formalistic style entails enforcing 
clear penalties, setting strict deadlines, and not considering 
mitigating circumstances of inspectees. Second, coercion highlights 
“the force of law” (2709). In practice, more coercive inspectors are 
very willing to implement—or threaten with—sanctions. Third, the 
educational dimension stresses “the communicative function of the 
law” (2709). Here, educating inspectees and the public, which can, 
in turn, pressure for more responsible behavior, is central. Fourth, 
prioritization is defined as “pragmatic enforcement that tries to get 
the most effective result within the given contextual constraints and 
while considering the circumstances at hand” (2709). A prioritizing 
enforcement style entails, for instance, prioritizing violations in 
determining the consequences. Finally, accommodation refers to “the 
reconciliation of the demands of key stake holders in regulatory 
enforcement” (2710). In other words, inspectors’ keep the opinions 
of others—such as their supervisors—in the back of their mind 
during regulatory encounters with inspectees.
Lo, Fryxell, and Van Rooij (2009) were the first to show that 
enforcement style is, indeed, composed of more than two 
dimensions. There are, however, some limitations to their study. 
First, their instrument is tested among Chinese inspectors, and it is 
unclear whether their scales are valid beyond that research context 
(de Boer 2017). Second, their scales are created ad hoc and not 
validated using steps such as exploratory and confirmatory factor 
analyses or interviewing experts (DeVellis 2016). Building on 
Lo, Fryxell, and Van Rooij (2009), de Boer (2017) has furthered 
the conceptualization and measurement of enforcement style by 
redeveloping and validating a measurement scale. This work brings 
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together the classic conceptualization of the two-dimensional 
enforcement style (May and Winter 1999, 2000) and the five-
dimensional enforcement style (Lo, Fryxell, and Van Rooij 2009).
De Boer (2017) finds that enforcement style is composed of three 
dimensions, namely, (1) legal, which combines both rigid and 
coercive applications of the law; (2) facilitation, incorporating 
the communicative application of the law and accounting 
for situational characteristics of inspectees; and, finally, (3) 
accommodation, which entails taking the opinions of others into 
account. In this study, we use de Boer’s (2017) scales because 
they have been validated using measurement development and 
validation steps (DeVellis 2016).
Disclosure of Performance Information
There is a trend toward making more information available to 
the public about the ways that government and its clients are 
performing (Grimmelikhuijsen and Welch 2012; Van Dooren and 
Van de Walle 2008; Van Erp 2009, 2010). Although the extent of 
disclosure of this information varies across governments, it makes 
the work of both agencies and individual inspectors more visible 
to the public (e.g., Etienne 2015; Gilad, Maor, and Bloom 2015; 
Meijer 2013; Maor and Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2013; Winter 2003). 
Performance information is defined as “systematic information 
describing the outputs and outcomes of public programs and 
other organizations—whether intended or otherwise—generated 
by systems and processes intended to produce such information” 
(Pollitt 2006, 39). In this study, disclosing performance information 
refers specifically to disclosed information about the compliance 
performance of inspectees provided by government agencies for 
other stakeholders.
The degree of disclosure of performance information can vary 
along three dimensions: (1) completeness, (2) coloring, and (3) 
usability (Douglas and Meijer 2016; Grimmelikhuijsen 2012). 
First, completeness of the information can range from “basic, brief 
information without any details or consist of elaborate information 
in the form of both quantitative and qualitative data” (Douglas 
and Meijer 2016, 942). Second, coloring of the information 
refers to how “information about the organization can never be 
presented in a fully neutral manner” (Douglas and Meijer 2016, 
942) and consists of a certain frame. Finally, usability of the 
information entails that “information can be made available in an 
accessible format, which is easily understandable for a layperson, 
or be presented in such a way that only committed experts can 
understand it” (Douglas and Meijer 2016, 942). Governments vary 
in the extent to which the performance information they disclose 
meets these criteria and thus how visible their work is, as well as that 
of their inspectors.
Notably, the implications of disclosing performance information are 
twofold. On the one hand, regulators disclose information about 
the compliance performance of their inspectees. On the other hand, 
the task of regulators is to ensure compliance of inspectees with 
rules and regulations (Baldwin, Scott, and Hood 1998; Sparrow 
2000). When regulators disclose the compliance performance 
of their inspectees, their own performance becomes available for 
monitoring. The less inspectees violate rules and regulations, the 
more the regulator is seen as performing well.
Hypothesized Impact of Disclosing Performance Information 
on Enforcement Style
Scholars have started to investigate whether this increasing visibility 
of inspectors’ work may help capture variations in enforcement 
(e.g., Etienne 2015; Winter 2003). Inspectors are classic street-
level bureaucrats with substantive discretion and autonomy to 
make judgments during interactions with inspectees (Lipsky 
2010; Raaphorst 2018). The increased visibility of regulators 
caused by disclosing performance information and the associated 
reaction of inspectees during regulatory encounters contribute to 
the uncertainties that inspectors face and, in turn, influence their 
enforcement style. The disclosure of performance information may 
have an impact directly and indirectly on inspectors’ enforcement 
style.
A direct relation is hypothesized because disclosing performance 
information may increase uncertainties inspectors’ experience. 
During regulatory encounters, inspectors face uncertainties 
because they must apply their professional knowledge to complex 
inspection situations using limited information. Inspectors must 
interpret the situation at hand, find out what is happening, and 
determine the appropriate outcome of the face-to-face interaction 
(Mascini and Van Wijk 2009; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 
2003; Raaphorst 2018). Publishing performance information makes 
the performance of inspectees part of the public sphere (Van Erp 
2009, 2010). Stakeholders can scrutinize not just the inspectees but 
also the regulators responsible for ensuring compliance (Carpenter 
2010; Gilad 2012). The stakeholders are thus empowered to make 
judgments about the performance of regulators and their inspectors 
based on the disclosed information (see Carpenter 2010; Klijn and 
Koppenjan 2016; Meijer 2013), which increases the uncertainties 
that inspectors face.
Therefore, it is expected that inspectors who perceived the 
disclosure of performance information to be substantive will 
become more legal, less facilitative, and more accommodative 
in their enforcement style. First, inspectors are expected to 
become more legal and thus rigidly apply rules and regulations 
because sticking to procedures they know can be used to reduce 
uncertainties. Procedures prescribe fixed elements for their 
ways of working, thus reducing uncertainties (Maynard-Moody 
and Musheno 2012; Raaphorst 2018). In addition, procedures 
provide legitimacy and approval within the organization. Second, 
inspectors are hypothesized to have a low facilitation style and 
thus do not substantively provide information on how compliance 
can be improved or consider the circumstances of inspectees. 
By sticking to standards and facts, inspectors minimize the 
uncertainty that unambiguous enforcement behavior is made 
visible or inspectees are empowered to make judgments about their 
performance (see Carpenter 2010; Gilad 2012). Finally, inspectors 
are expected to become more accommodative because when they 
perceive that other stakeholders, such as their team leaders and 
colleagues, think similarly about the way they enforce, uncertainty 
is reduced. In this way, they have “a backing” (Hupe and Hill 
2007). The hypotheses read as follows:
Hypothesis 1a: Inspectors with a high score on perceived 
disclosure of performance information will have a high score 
on legal enforcement style.
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Hypothesis 1b: Inspectors with a high score on perceived 
disclosure of performance information will have a low score 
on facilitation enforcement style.
Hypothesis 1c: Inspectors with a high score on perceived 
disclosure of performance information will have a high score 
on accommodation enforcement style.
To gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between 
disclosure of performance information and enforcement style, it is 
important to look at indirect effects. Street-level work is inherently 
relational in nature and characterized by face-to-face encounters 
(Lipsky 2010). Therefore, the relation between inspector and 
inspectee is considered and, more specifically, the resistance that 
inspectors perceive during regulatory encounters.
First, as mentioned earlier, disclosing performance information 
is intended to stimulate compliance of inspectees (Meijer and 
Homburg 2009; Van de Walle and Roberts 2008). Disclosing 
noncompliant behavior embarrasses inspectees by harming their 
reputation, which, in turn, incentivizes compliance (Etienne 2015; 
Schillemans 2008; Van Erp 2009, 2010). This risk of reputation 
damage may increase resistance against inspectors during face-to-
face encounters (e.g., Etienne 2015). On top of that, laws about 
disclosure and its consequences for the inspectee can simply be 
too complex and exhaustive (Nielsen 2016). This may also lead 
inspectees to resist more during regulatory encounters by way of 
asking for clarification or negotiating (see Etienne 2015). Perceived 
resistance is understood as “doubt about the intentions of the 
[inspector] to behave cooperatively and benignly toward those [she 
or he] dominates” (Murphy 2004, 194). It is thus expected that 
inspectors with a high score on perceived disclosure of performance 
information will have a high score on perceived resistance.
Hypothesis 2: Inspectors with a high score on perceived 
disclosed performance information will have a high score on 
perceived resistance.
Second, resistance at the street level may harm the social interactions 
between the inspector and inspectee. Inspectors operate in a context of 
sanctioning and limiting citizens’ or organizations’ freedom in order to 
ensure compliance (Baldwin, Scott, and Hood 1998). Inspectors thus 
“deliver obligations rather than services” (Sparrow 2000, 2). Delivering 
obligations goes hand in hand with negotiations during regulatory 
encounters, which, in turn, increases uncertainties for inspectors 
because they may have to improvise on the spot (Etienne 2015; 
Raaphorst 2018). Much like the hypothesized direct relationship 
between perceived disclosure of performance information above (see 
hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c), inspectors are expected to reduce these 
uncertainties and enforce accordingly. The hypotheses read as follows:
Hypothesis 3a: Inspectors with a high score on perceived 
resistance will have a high score on legal enforcement style.
Hypothesis 3b: Inspectors with a high score on perceived 
resistance will have a low score on facilitation enforcement style.
Hypothesis 3c: Inspectors with a high score on perceived 
resistance will have a high score on accommodation 
enforcement style.
Figure 1 depicts all hypothesized relations.
Method
The conceptual model was tested at the Netherlands Food and 
Consumer Product Safety Authority (Nederlandse Voedsel en 
Warenautoriteit, NVWA). The NVWA was selected because it is 
one of the largest regulators in the Netherlands, charged with the 
important task of overseeing companies involved in food production 
and product safety in order to ensure public health and animal 
welfare. The NVWA is currently developing and implementing ways 
of disclosing information about inspectees’ performance. The NVWA 
is not developing one universal way for disclosing performance 
information concerning all its inspection tasks (i.e., public safety, 
public health, and animal welfare). Each division of the NVWA deals 
with multiple inspection topics. The NVWA is customizing the way 
performance information is disclosed for each inspection topic in 
order to ensure maximum impact on the compliance of inspectees. 
To illustrate, for some inspection topics, the compliance performance 
of inspectees is made available by disclosing full inspection reports, 
while for other topics, traffic-light symbols accompanied by the most 
important indicators are made available via a smartphone application.
Data
The data were collected in October and November 2016 using 
an online survey with active cooperation of NVWA. The NVWA 
Figure 1 Conceptual Model
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is made up of a board of directors, an advisory body, and five 
divisions: Staff, Management, Veterinary and Import, Agriculture 
and Nature, and Consumer and Safety. This study focuses solely on 
inspectors who conduct face-to-face inspection visits, and therefore 
only inspectors working in the Veterinary and Import, Agriculture 
and Nature, and Consumer and Safety division were included. 
Only in these three divisions are inspectors employed who conduct 
inspection visits. The sample frame consists of all NVWA inspectors 
(n = 1,201) working in the Veterinary and Import, Agriculture and 
Nature, and Consumer and Safety divisions.
Respondents were assured that their answers would be fully 
anonymous and confidential. The questionnaire includes new 
scales that were validated through expert interviews (n = 11). The 
consulted experts consisted of individual inspectors (n = 6) and 
a senior staff committee (n = 5). Respondents were informed by 
email about the study, reminded at two-week intervals, and had 
six weeks to complete the questionnaire. In total, 679 inspectors 
completed the questionnaire, resulting in a response rate of 56.5 
percent. Nonresponse was present in multiple variables. In all, 172 
respondents filled in only 50 percent or less. These respondents 
were excluded from the analysis, resulting in a total sample of 507 
respondents.
In terms of demographics, 71.9 percent were male, 27.7 percent 
female, and 0.4 percent other. Respondents were between 23 
and 73 years old (M = 47.99, SD = 12.85), and experience as an 
inspector ranged from 1 to 43 years (M = 16.27, SD = 11.22). Of 
the respondents, 33.3 percent worked in the division Consumer 
and Safety, 34.7 percent in Veterinary and Import, 31.7 percent 
in Agriculture and Nature, and 0.4 percent in other. The sample 
is representative of the total population. Only work experience 
in the sample was slightly lower than that of the total population 
(M = 21.3), which should be considered when interpreting the 
results.
Measures
The key variables to be explained are enforcement style, perceived 
degree of disclosure of performance information, and perceived 
resistance. An overview of the items of all variables can be found in 
the appendix.
Enforcement style. Drawing on de Boer (2017), enforcement style 
was measured on three dimensions: (1) legal, (2) facilitation, and (3) 
accommodation. Legal was measured using five items and 
facilitation and accommodation using four items on a 10-point scale 
ranging from “never” (1) to “always” (10). Items included the 
following: during inspections I focus on “making strict agreements 
with clients” (legal); “clarifying rules and regulations to clients” 
(facilitation); “the opinions of inspectors from my team about 
enforcing” (accommodation). Reliability for all three factors was 
above the .7 threshold (ω = .80 [legal], ω = .85 [facilitation], and 
ω = .83 [accommodation]), indicating acceptable reliability.1
Perceived degree of disclosure of performance information. 
Building on transparency scholarship, the perception of disclosure 
of performance information of inspectors was operationalized to 
consist of three criteria: (1) completeness, (2) coloring, and (3) 
usability (Douglas and Meijer 2016; Grimmelikhuijsen 2012). For 
each criterion, two items were formulated, resulting in a six-item 
measure. Items included the following: I would typify the inspection 
results that the NVWA discloses as “complete” (completeness); 
“without judgment” (coloring); and “understandable for 
nonexperts” (usability). Exploratory factor analysis showed that the 
third criteria (usability) entails a separate factor. Since usability was 
measured on only two items, both items were omitted. The resulting 
four-item measure is reliable (ω = .89).2
Perceived resistance. Perceived resistance was based on 
Braithwaite’s (2003) and Murphy’s (2004) studies targeting 
taxpayers and measuring their doubt about the intentions of the 
Tax Authority. Inspired by Murphy’s (2004) scale, five items were 
formulated to fit the viewpoint of the inspectors and their context. 
All items were reverse-coded. Items included, “it is possible to 
satisfy clients completely” and “clients actively help during 
inspections.” Two items were dropped after an exploratory factor 
analysis was conducted because of low factor loadings (less than .4) 
or cross-loadings (greater than .3), resulting in a reliable three-item 
measure (ω = .71).3
Controls. There are also several controls included based on the 
correlation table, namely, rule obedience and several demographics 
(gender and work experience).
Common Source Bias
The variables in this study are inherently perceptual, making 
a survey the appropriate method (George and Pandey 2017; 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, and Podsakoff 2012). Potential common 
source bias was minimized using design remedies (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, and Podsakoff 2012). First, the questionnaire was 
tested among informants, which increases face validity. Second, the 
dependent and independent variables were presented on separate 
pages of the questionnaire. Third, variables that consisted of 
multiple items were given a different color to increase respondent 
focus. Fourth, the respondents were incentivized to participate 
by informing them that a short report would be shared with 
them and the management of the NVWA. Finally, organizational 
support ensured that inspectors were informed through different 
channels and by different people (the researchers, their team 
leaders, management) about the importance of participating 
in this research (George and Pandey 2017; Lee, Benoit-Bryan, 
and Johnson 2012; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, and Podsakoff 2012; 
Podsakoff and Organ 1986).
Post hoc statistical remedies indicate that common source bias 
does not substantially impact the findings of this study. First, a 
confirmatory factor analysis was carried out (Podsakoff et al. 2003). 
All variables in the conceptual model were loaded on one factor. The 
fit of the model was assessed using the comparative fit index (CFI), 
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA), and standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). 
Cutoff criteria are between ≥ .95 (good fit) and ≥ .90 (moderate fit) 
for CFI and TLI; between ≤ .06 (good fit) and ≤ .08 (moderate fit) 
for RMSEA with PCLOSE >.05; and ≤ .08 (good fit) for SRMR 
(Hu and Bentler 1999). The model fit (χ2 = 1537.436, df = 171, 
p = .000)4 is very poor, with CFI = .397, TLI = .330, RSMEA = .169, 
PCLOSE = .000 and SRMR = .160. Second, a common latent 
factor model was estimated (Podsakoff et al. 2003). All items were 
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Table 1 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (n = 507)
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1  Perceived degree of disclosed 
performance information
5.5 1.98 1
2 Legal style 8.04 1.06 0.12** 1
3 Facilitation style 7.40 1.43 0.25*** 0.34*** 1
4 Accommodation style 5.80 1.83 0.32*** 0.21*** 0.32*** 1
5 Perceived resistance 5.68 1.63 –0.11** –0.04 –0.22*** –0.09 1
6 Work experience 16.37 11.18 –0.06 0.00 0.15** 0.04 0.00 1
7 Gender (1 = female) 0.28 0.45 –0.07 –0.04 –0.05 –0.10** –0.01 –0.34*** 1
8 Gender (1 = other) 0.00 0.06 –0.01 –0.01 0.01 –0.06 0.05 –0.04 –0.04 1
9 Rule obedience 7.57 1.44 0.08 0.31*** 0.07 0.10** –0.05 –0.01 0.01 –0.03
***p < .001; **p < .05.
loaded on their theoretical constructs as well as on a first-order 
factor. An ANOVA testing the χ2 differences between the common 
latent factor model and the conceptual model was not statistically 
significant (χ2 difference = 2.1991, df = 2, p = .3333). Thus, including 
the common latent factor did not improve the model.
Findings
Several analyses were conducted to determine whether perceived 
disclosed performance information impacts inspectors’ style 
during regulatory encounters as well as whether this is mediated 
by perceived resistance using the statistical program R. More 
specifically, the packages lavaan (Rosseel 2011), psych (Revelle 
2014), semTools (Pornprasertmanit et al. 2013), and semPlot 
(Epskamp 2013) were used. The parameters were estimated using 
the Satorra-Bentler correction because our data slightly violates 
assumptions of multivariate normality (Satorra and Bentler 1994).
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and the correlations 
between the perceived disclosure of performance information, the 
three dimensions of enforcement style, and perceived resistance. 
The correlations between perceived disclosure of performance 
information and legal (.12), facilitation (.25), and accommodation 
(.32) enforcement style are all statistically significant. The three 
enforcement styles also correlate significantly at the .001 level. 
Perceived resistance, the mediator in the conceptual model, 
correlates negatively with a facilitation style (–0.22). Perceived 
resistance also negatively correlates significantly with perceived 
disclosed performance information (–0.11) and does not correlate 
with a formal or accommodation style, which contradicts our 
theoretical expectations.
None of the control variables correlates with the independent 
variable (perceived disclosure of performance information) and the 
mediator (perceived resistance).4 A legal style correlates significantly 
with rule obedience (.31), a facilitation style with work experience 
(.15), and an accommodation style with the gender dummy 
(1 = female) (–.10) as well as rule obedience (.10). All other control 
variables correlating significantly were included in the model.
To further investigate the relation between the variables, structural 
equation modeling (SEM) is used, specifically, a fully latent 
structural regression modeling (Kline 2015). SEM is used because 
of the latent nature of the dependent, independent, and mediator 
variables and the multiple regressions hypothesized. The model 
fit (χ2 = 409.230, df = 216, p = .000)5 is good, with CFI = .923, 
TLI = .911, RSMEA = .048, PCLOSE = .679, and SRMR = .057.
Table 2 and figure 2 show shows the results of the hypothesized 
direct and indirect effects. First, the direct effects are discussed. 
Hypothesis 1a expected that the inspectors who score high on 
perceived disclosure of performance information will also score high 
on legal style. The standardized coefficients for legal enforcement 
style are, indeed, statistically significant, indicating that the greater 
inspectors perceive the disclosure of performance information to 
Figure 2 Graphical Representation of Results of Structural Equation Modeling
Does Disclosure of Performance Information Influence Street-level Bureaucrats’ Enforcement Style? 7
be, the greater their legal enforcement style (z = 2.331, st.B = .156, 
SE = .037, p = .020). Hypothesis 1b expected that when inspectors’ 
perceptions of disclosed performance information increase, their 
facilitation enforcement style will decrease. This relationship 
is also statistically significant, but in the opposite direction as 
hypothesized. This study finds that as the perception of disclosure 
of performance information of inspectors rises, so does their 
facilitation enforcement style (z = 5.086, st.B = .306, SE = .038, 
p = .000). This is the exact opposite of the expected relationship. 
Hypothesis 1c concerns the accommodation enforcement style 
of inspectors. It was expected that inspectors who score high on 
the perceived disclosure of performance information will have 
a high accommodation enforcement style. The standardized 
coefficients are, as expected, statistically significant (z = 5.447 
st.B = .335, SE = .050, p = .000). In other words, the greater 
inspectors perceive the disclosure of performance information to 
be, the greater their accommodation enforcement style. The effect 
of disclosure of performance information is about half as small for 
legal style (st.B = .156) as opposed to the effect on accommodation 
(St.B = .335) and facilitation (St.B = .306) style.
Our second and third set of hypotheses concern the indirect effect 
of perceived disclosed performance information on enforcement 
style through the mediator perceived resistance. Hypothesis 2 
stated that a high score on perceived disclosure of performance 
information will lead to high scores on perceived resistance of 
inspectees. This relationship is found to be statistically significant, 
but negatively instead of positively (z = –2.342, st.B = –.143, 
SE = .028, p = .019). When inspectors perceive the disclosure of 
performance information to be greater, they perceive less resistance 
by inspectees. The third set of hypotheses expected that high 
scores on perceived resistance by inspectees will lead to a more 
legal (hypothesis 3a), less facilitation (hypothesis 3b), and more 
accommodation (hypothesis 3c) enforcement style. Only the 
relation between perceived resistance and a facilitation style is 
statistically significant (z = –3.084, st.B = –.241, SE = .109, p = .002). 
In other words, when inspectors perceive resistance by inspectees to 
be greater, they become less facilitating in their style.
In this line of reasoning, when investigating the total indirect 
effects of an inspector’s perceived disclosure of performance 
information on all three dimensions of enforcement style through 
perceived resistance, one statistically significant relation is found. 
The relationship between the inspectors’ perception of disclosed 
performance information and a facilitation style is mediated 
by their perceived resistance (z = 2.130, st.B = .035, SE = .010, 
p = .033). Notably, the total indirect effect is small but statistically 
significant. When an inspector scores high on perceived disclosure 
of performance information, he or she perceives less resistance by 
inspectees, which leads to a more facilitating enforcement style. See 
table 3 for an overview of confirmed and disconfirmed hypotheses.
Conclusion and Discussion
This study contributes to scholarship addressing why street-level 
bureaucrats vary in their enforcement styles during regulatory 
encounters. In terms of theory, this study proposed that researching 
the impact of disclosed performance information as well as the 
perceived resistance of inspectees can help explain enforcement style 
variations. On basis of the literature on street-level enforcement 
(Lo, Fryxell, and Van Rooij 2009; May and Winter 1999, 2000) 
and disclosing performance information (Gilad, Maor, and Bloom 
2015; Maor and Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2013; Van Dooren and Van 
de Walle 2008; Van Erp 2009, 2010), this study theorized that 
making the compliance performance information of inspectees part 
of the public sphere will add visibility and, in turn, uncertainty for 
Table 2 Results of Structural Equation Modeling
Dependent Variables
Legal Style Facilitation Style Accommodation Style Perceived Resistance
Independent variables z St.SE St.B z St.SE St.B z St.SE St.B z St.SE St.B
Direct effects
Perceived degree of disclosed 
performance information
2.331 0.037 0.156** 5.086 0.038 0.306*** 5.447 0.050 0.335*** –2.343 0.028 –0.143**
Perceived resistance –0.169 0.082 –0.012 –3.084 0.109 –0.241** –0.097 0.117 –0.054 — — —
Indirect effects via perceived resistance
Perceived degree of disclosed 
performance information
0.171 0.005 0.002 2.130 0.010 0.035** 0.804 0.008 0.008 — — —
Total effects
Perceived degree of disclosed 
performance information
2.310 0.038 0.157** 5.557 0.039 0.341*** 5.605 0.050 0.343*** — — —
***p < .001; **p < .05.
Table 3 Results of Hypotheses
Hypothesized Relationship Confirmed?
1a Inspectors with a high score on perceived disclosure of 
performance information will have a high score on 
legal enforcement style.
Yes
1b Inspectors with a high score on perceived disclosure of 




1c Inspectors with a high score on perceived disclosure of 
performance information will have a high score on 
accommodation enforcement style.
Yes
2 Inspectors with a high score on perceived disclosed 




3a Inspectors with a high score on perceived resistance will 
have a high score on legal enforcement style.
No
3b Inspectors with a high score on perceived resistance will 
have a low score on facilitation enforcement style.
Yes
3c Inspectors with a high score on perceived resistance  
will have a high score on accommodation  
enforcement style.
No
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inspectors and thus stimulate them to adapt their enforcement style. 
A significant direct effect of inspectors’ perception of disclosure of 
performance information on all three dimensions of enforcement 
style (legal, facilitation, and accommodation) was found. Also, a 
significant indirect effect was revealed between perceived disclosure 
of performance information, perceived resistance, and enforcement 
facilitation style.
First and foremost, this study enhances the understanding of 
enforcement and regulation by showing that disclosing performance 
information, which makes both the compliance performance of 
inspectees and the activities of the regulators publicly accessible, 
impacts inspectors’ frontline enforcement behavior (see Etienne 
2015). More specifically, inspectors intensify all three dimensions 
(legal, facilitation, and accommodation) of their enforcement style 
when they perceive the disclosure of performance information to be 
substantive. Future research is needed to understand the unintended 
consequences of disclosing performance information for street-level 
behavior. To illustrate, disclosing performance information is meant 
to empower other stakeholders to hold regulators accountable 
(see Bovens 2007; Van de Walle and Roberts 2008). However, 
such disclosure may result in perverse incentives (Freeman 2002) 
such as gaming behavior by the regulators (Courty and Marschke 
2004; Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 2009) to avoid increasing 
visibility or mitigate possible consequences of this. For instance, 
inspectors may take extra time to complete inspection visits or resist 
conducting complex inspections such as the complete closure of 
businesses. Taking more time and prioritizing easy inspection visits 
may, in turn, boost the inspectors’ scores on the performance criteria 
of the organization. In addition, inspectors may also intentionally 
leave details out of the inspector report or do the opposite and, thus, 
include too many details. These unintended consequences may not, 
in the end, foster but harm the quality of regulation (cf. Freeman 
2002; Werner and Asch 2005). Future research connecting street-
level enforcement style to these potential unintended could shed 
more light on this.
Second, opposed to our expectations, inspectors tend to facilitate 
more rather than less during regulatory encounters when 
they perceive the disclosure of performance information to be 
substantive. This could possibly be explained by the relational 
nature of enforcement (Lipsky 2010). First, disclosing performance 
information is relatively new and may damage the reputation of 
inspectees (e.g., Van Erp 2009, 2010) which, in turn, may harm 
their relationship with regulators. Inspectors may use a facilitation 
enforcement style because providing information and considering 
circumstances at hand fosters trust and, in turn, enhances a 
cooperative relation between inspector and inspectee (e.g., Pautz 
2009; Pautz and Wamsley 2012) and mitigates the “hard” signal 
that disclosing performance information can be. In other words, 
inspectors may move toward clients (Tummers et al. 2015) by 
being facilitative in their style. Another explanation could be that 
because disclosing performance information makes the work of 
inspectors more visible (e.g., Winter 2003), they become more 
vulnerable in terms of blame. Inspectors will set out to minimize 
this risk (Hood 2010) and therefore may provide information and 
clarifications to ensure the inspectees’ knowledge of the implications 
of disclosure performance information is complete (cf. Nielsen 
2016). This may enhance the image that they did everything 
they could to communicate with inspectees. Further research 
(including experimental methods) in which the type of performance 
information that is collected or utilized is varied is needed to 
fully understand why inspectors become more facilitative in their 
enforcement style when they perceive the disclosure of performance 
information to be greater.
Third, this study also found that the strength of the effect of the 
perceived disclosure of performance information on the three 
enforcement style dimensions varies. The effect on the legal 
enforcement style is only half the effect on the accommodation 
and facilitation styles. These differences could be explained by 
the extent to which inspectors can use their discretionary space 
in each enforcement style. On the one hand, a legal style is 
closely associated with executing organizational protocols and 
rigidly sticking to rules and regulations (Baldwin, Cave, and 
Lodge 2012; de Boer 2017; Lo, Fryxell, and Van Rooij 2009; 
Mascini and Van Wijk 2009). This style gives inspectors little 
room to maneuver using their discretionary space. Facilitation 
and accommodation, on the other hand, are both styles that are 
less directly determined by organizational procedures. In other 
words, these two styles are associated with the discretionary 
space of inspectors (e.g., Lipsky 2010). Thus, the fact that the 
effect of disclosing performance information on facilitation and 
accommodation is larger than on a legal style can be explained by 
the notion that inspectors simply have more room to vary these 
styles than the legal style.
Finally, a surprising result of this study is that inspectors who 
perceive disclosure of performance information to be substantive do 
not perceive high resistance by inspectees. A potential explanation 
could be that inspectors view disclosing performance information 
as an effective instrument to enhance compliance (Meijer and 
Homburg 2009). In that sense, there will be less resistance among 
inspectees, since disclosure stimulates them to obey the rules and 
regulations. Future research, however, is needed to really clarify this 
result. Investigating the types of uncertainties inspectors experience 
(e.g., Raaphorst 2018) or their coping mechanisms (Tummers et al. 
2015) could be especially fruitful.
There are, of course, methodological limitations. Most importantly, 
using a single survey has been critiqued because it is at risk of 
common source bias and relationship overestimation (Meier and 
O’Toole 2013; Podsakoff and Organ 1986). Here, this critique 
has merit, but potential common source bias was an unavoidable 
limitation. First and foremost, all variables in our conceptual model 
are perceptual in nature (George and Pandey 2017). Nonetheless, 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, and Podsakoff (2012, 549) highlight that 
when “both the predictor and criterion variables are capturing 
individual’s perceptions, beliefs, judgments, or feelings,” surveys are 
the right choice of method. Second, other objective data sources 
were unavailable because of access limitations and privacy concerns 
within the organization used in this study (George and Pandey 
2017). As was already mentioned, perceptions are at the heart of 
this study and are best collected directly from the population of 
interest (in this case, inspectors). There are limited possibilities to 
collect this information in large quantities. Finally, the correlation 
matrix shows that not all variables are significantly positively related 
(George and Pandey 2017)—something that would be expected if 
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common source bias were present (Spector 2006). By using design 
and ex ante statistical remedies, this limitation was minimized.
There are also other limitations of this study. First, this study 
explains only part of the variation in enforcement style. Future 
research should further address inspectors’ behavior by studying 
the impact of other potential explanatory variables, such as 
political pressure (e.g., Moynihan and Hawes 2012). Second, a 
single organization was studied in this article. For generalization 
to other (regulation) organization and contexts, more cross-sector 
and cross-national research is needed. Future research can benefit 
from comparative approaches, including comparisons of different 
regulation systems such as command and control and bottom-up 
(voluntary based).
All in all, this study contributes to the public management and 
administration literature by showing that disclosing performance 
information is relevant for inspectors’ enforcement style and 
that the three dimensions of enforcement style are not mutually 
exclusive (see also May and Winter 1999, 2000). The study also 
highlights that inspectors are becoming more active in the sense 
of intensifying multiple enforcement styles as a result of disclosing 
performance information. They choose a more facilitative style, 
a more accommodative style, and, to lesser extent, a more legal 
style. The study also indicates that for a better understanding of 
inspectors’ enforcement styles, we should look at the interaction 
between inspectors with their environment, including the strategy 
of their organization regarding disclosing public information, and 
inspectees’ behavior.
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Notes
1. McDonald’s omega is reported rather than Cronbach’s alpha. Cronbach’s alpha 
has been heavily critiqued over the years because it is prone to over- and 
underestimation, which McDonald’s omega is not (e.g., Sijtsma 2009). Notably, 
the reliability for the three factors does not differ when calculating Cronbach’s 
alpha: α = .85 (legal), α = .88 (facilitation), and α = .83 (accommodation).
2 α = .88
3. The reliability for the three factors does not differ substantially when calculating 
Cronbach’s alpha (α = .69).
4. We ran the analysis including dummies for division as controls. However, model 
fit statistics worsened and indicated model misspecification. Notably, none of 
our statistically (in)significant results changed substantially.
5. That chi-square is significant is due to the large n (e.g., West, Taylor, and Wu 
2012).
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Appendix: Survey Items, Core Variables
Enforcement style
Legal (ω = .80; α = .80)
During inspections, I focus on:
• Implementing the intervention policy by following the letter of 
the law
• That I enforce in an unambiguous way
• That I make strict agreements with inspectees
• That I execute the inspection as complete as possible
• That I uphold high standards regarding inspectees’ compliance 
with rules and regulations
Facilitation (ω = .85; α = .85).
During inspections, I focus on:
• Transferring my professional knowledge to inspectees
• Giving indications how to improve compliance to inspectees
• Being as helpful as possible to inspectees
• The circumstances of inspectees that I encounter
Accommodation (ω = .83; α = .84).
During inspections, I consider:
• The opinions about inspecting of colleagues from my team
• The opinions about inspecting of other teams
• The opinion about inspecting of inspectees
• The opinions about inspecting of my team leader
Perceived resistance (ω = .71; α = .69)
• It is possible to satisfy clients completely (R)
• Clients actively help during inspections (R)
• Clients are forward with information during inspections (R)
Perceived degree of disclosed performance information (ω = .89; 
α = .88). 
I would typify the inspection results that the NVWA discloses as:
• Complete
• Detailed
• Shedding light on all aspects of an inspection
• Without judgment
Rule obedience
In general, I am someone who follows the rules even if I disagree 
with them.
Gender
What is your gender?
Work experience 
How many years have you been employed as an inspector at the 
NVWA (or predecessors of the NVWA)?
